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POSITIVE RIGHTS: THE NEW YORK “BABY AIDS BILL” AS
STATE-CREATED DANGER
Aaron Badida*
Abstract
The New York “Baby AIDS Bill” created a requirement for
mandatory, unblind testing of newborns for HIV. This law, and its
associated regulatory infrastructure, is contrary to a number of deeply
rooted substantive due process rights, including the right to refuse lifesustaining treatment and the right to privacy and bodily autonomy. When
the state requires that a physician initiate care or treatment, the
government exposes itself to liability under the state-created danger
doctrine, particularly when resistance-prone conditions like HIV are
involved. In this unique situation, the state’s requirement to initiate
antiretroviral care without providing for its continuity puts infants living
with HIV at a significant risk of developing treatment resistance. One
solution to this constitutionally problematic health policy is to recognize
a positive right to health care for these infants, as a means of mitigating
the danger so long as the unblind testing and treatment requirement
exists,.
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INTRODUCTION
Few areas of domestic policy in the United States have been as
vigorously debated in the last decade as health care.1 Ideologically,
universal health care is an attractive policy, and establishing a basic level
of care as a substantive right coheres with ideals of a continuously
improving standard of living, resource conscious social welfare
measures, and an aspirational regard for a decent quality of life.2
However, mere ideological attractiveness has never been recognized as a
sufficient basis for judicial or legislative recognition of a “new”
substantive right, especially one that the government is to fully subsidize,
like health care. This is not necessarily because of any moral deficit in
the American conscience; rather, as Judge Richard Posner famously
wrote, “the Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive
liberties.”3 In other words, U.S. citizens, by the structure and design of
the government, are given freedoms from, rather than guaranteed any
freedoms to.4
To this end, American jurisprudence has routinely denied positive
rights to citizens.5 Nonetheless, there exist two types of factual scenarios
where a citizen has successfully won recognition of a positive liberty
from the courts. The first is when the citizen has the status of a ward
(typically incarcerated) and, being in state custody, is reliant on the state

1. The recent 2016 election is one example of this issue. No candidate offered a blanket
endorsement of President Obama’s health care bill as passed in 2010. Central to the health care
debate was the question of whether the United States was ready to embrace health care as a
fundamental right for all Americans. Only Senator Bernie Sanders’s proposal for universal health
care answered this question affirmatively. See Robert D. Reischauer & Alice M. Rivlin, Health
Policy Issues and the 2016 Presidential Election, BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 18, 2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/health-policy-issues-and-the-2016-presidential-election/
[https://perma.cc/H2RK-8KJP]; see also Alison Kodjak, All Things Considered: Platform Check:
Trump and Clinton on Health Care, NPR (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/11/02/
500371785/platform-check-trump-and-clinton-on-health-care [https://perma.cc/HG34-2F7G].
2. Allen E. Buchanan, The Right to a Decent Minimum of Health Care, 13 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 55, 58–59 (1984).
3. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983).
4. David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864,
866 (1986).
5. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973)
(“Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal
Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”); Jackson, 715
F.2d at 1204 (“[A]s currently understood, the concept of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment
does not include a right to basic services, whether competently provided or otherwise.”).
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to affirmatively provide certain benefits,6 such as basic medical care.7
The second is closely related, and arises when a state actor acts
affirmatively to place a citizen in circumstances that leave the citizen
worse off than had the state not acted at all.8 Under this precedent, there
are few possible factual scenarios where the state (or even the federal
government) would create an obligation to provide health care for a
citizen.
In 1993, New York State legislature introduced a public health bill
that would position a narrow and unlikely population to potentially assert
that the government assumed an obligation to provide care: HIV-positive
babies. After nearly a decade of seeing acquired immunodeficiency
syndrome (AIDS) take more than 510,000 lives,9 New York emerged as
a leader in health policy in the late 1980s. State and municipal health
agencies in New York worked to aggressively curtail the spread of the
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), which researchers had found was
the pathological cause of developing AIDS.10 New York, like many
states, adopted—as one means of monitoring the prevalence of HIV—the
mandatory blind testing of all newborns in a piece of legislation called
the “Baby AIDS Bill.”11 The effect of the original bill was purely
statistical monitoring with no bridge to treatment.12 Finding this
unacceptable, Assemblywoman Nettie Mayersohn led the charge to not
only remove the blind testing provision, but also to ensure treatment of
those infants who have a positive serostatus (indicating HIV+ status
through the presence of antibodies).13 Amidst a widely publicized debate
6. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324–25 (1982) (holding that the state is responsible
for the safety of individuals in its custody or care).
7. Currie, supra note 4, at 874.
8. White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381, 383 (7th Cir. 1979).
9. Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, HIV and AIDS—United States, 1981–2000, 50
MMWR WEEKLY 430, 431 (2001), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/wk/mm5021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/64SC-M4GJ].
10. See generally N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH AIDS INST., JULY 30, 1983–JULY 30, 2008:
25 YEARS OF LEADERSHIP, SERVICE AND COMPASSION (2010) (describing New York State’s
response to the HIV/AIDS epidemic starting in the early 1980s).
11. Nettie Mayersohn, The “Baby AIDS” Bill, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 721, 721–22 (1997).
12. See, e.g., id. at 722 (“[W]hen a newborn tested positive, nothing was done to get the
infants into treatment.”).
13. HIV/AIDS Glossary: Serostatus, U.S. DEP’T. HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.: AIDS INFO,
https://aidsinfo.nih.gov/understanding-hiv-aids/glossary/1632/serostatus [https://perma.cc/
Z5BX-GYBQ] (last updated Nov. 19, 2018). Serostatus is the clinical term for a person’s HIV
status. All babies born to HIV-positive mothers will have a positive serostatus at birth, since they
have temporarily inherited antibodies from their mothers’ immune systems while their own
develops. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., HIV/AIDS PROGRAMME: WHO RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE
DIAGNOSIS OF HIV INFECTION IN INFANTS AND CHILDREN 30 (2010). Because of this, it takes
eighteen months to determine whether the baby is independently HIV-positive. See id.; see also
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over privacy rights of mothers, their partners, and children, Mayersohn
succeeded in securing unblind testing of infants and their mothers.14
Since 1997, the health care community has learned much about HIV
treatment and prevention. When mothers know their serostatus,
transmission of the virus can be almost certainly prevented.15 The
scientific community has also learned that HIV medications may become
ineffective over the course of a person’s lifetime, especially if care is
discontinuous.16 Therefore, the question surfaces: if New York has a
statutory requirement for the “responsible physician” to initiate health
care for HIV-positive newborns,17 is New York establishing a right for
infants to receive health care related to treatment and maintenance of HIV
from the state?
To answer this question, Part I will examine the judicial history of
how fundamental liberties are established by exploring substantive due
process in the context of medical rights. It will also identify the scant
positive rights that have been recognized in state protection and statecreated danger cases. It will argue that through rulings on reproductive
rights, medical aid-in-dying, and state-created danger cases, the courts
have created precedent that makes the current Baby AIDS Bill untenable
and unconstitutional.
Part II will explore the legislative history and intent behind the Baby
AIDS Bill and discuss some of its medical implications. It will argue that,
under current substantive due process and state-created danger doctrines,
the circumstances created by the regulations of the Baby AIDS Bill are
factually and legally situated to establish a positive right to health care in
newborns who receive mandatory treatment for their HIV-positive status
without express consent from their mothers. This bill and regulation, the
state temporarily supplants the parent in making health care decisions for
the child, induces reliance on a therapy, and then fails to provide for its
Mayersohn, supra note 11, at 726 (“By relying on blinded testing, we are in no way protecting
women. Women need to know as soon as possible about their own condition and that of their
babies so they can make immediate healthcare decisions; so they can make decisions on future
pregnancies; so they can make arrangements for the care of their children if or when they,
themselves, can no longer care for them.”).
14. Mayersohn, supra note 11, at 727.
15. Preventing Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS.: AIDS INFO, https://aidsinfo.nih.gov/understanding-hiv-aids/fact-sheets/20/50/preventing
-mother-to-child-transmission-of-hiv [https://perma.cc/XC6Z-FN6R] (last updated May 24,
2018).
16. C. Holkmann Olsen, et al., Interruption of Combination Antiretroviral Therapy and
Risk of Clinical Disease Progression to AIDS or Death, 8 HIV MED. 96, 96 (2007).
17. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 69-1.5 (2018). This section of the public health
regulations also applies to other illnesses that may be present but initially undetectable at birth.
HIV is unique in that beginning treatment and then stopping treatment may make it harder to
manage later on. See Olsen, et al., supra note 16.
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continuity. This Note proposes that recognizing a positive right to health
care is one means of preserving the positive aspects of the Baby AIDS
Bill without merely creating a different risk of harm through treatment.
This Note will conclude with a brief examination of the policy
implications of recognizing a positive right to health care in newborns
treated for HIV.
I. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS FOSTERS LIMITED LIBERTIES IN
HEALTH CARE
To discuss contemporary positive rights jurisprudence, it is necessary
to understand the basic political philosophy of rights as they were
construed in the drafting of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Three
decades prior to the drafting of these documents, Thomas Jefferson
described the Enlightenment view of rights as “immutable,”
“inalienable,” and “natural”18 in the Declaration of Independence,
recognizing also that a government was essential to secure them.19
Contrary to early interpretations of the Constitution, the classical
liberalism with which Jefferson crafted the Declaration and influenced
the framers did not exclude social and economic rights—those most often
seen as “positive rights.”20
By 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, rigid
originalism had become much less workable as changes in culture,
society, and politics helped show that some “rights” anticipated by the
Constitution
were
more
reasonably
“a
constitutionally
guaranteed . . . sphere of individual liberty” and therefore not so flat and
immutable.21 Courts could expand (or contract) what was encompassed
by or implicit in a right or liberty through the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Specifically, Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment—
another set of negative liberties—introduced three protected rights that
would become integral in fostering the contemporary American welfare
state: the Privileges and Immunities Clause; the Equal Protection Clause;
and, of interest to this Note, the Due Process Clause.22 These new
protections were implemented in the wake of the American Civil War,
18. C.J. Friedrich, Rights, Liberties, Freedoms, 91 U. PA. L. REV. 312, 312 (1943).
19. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
20. Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic
Guarantees?, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 9 (2005).
21. Friedrich, supra note 18.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Due process was first tested in the Slaughter-House
Cases, where a state-created monopoly was awarded to one meat processor, and other meat
processors claimed that they were therefore deprived of economic liberty. The Slaughter-House
Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 57–62 (1872). The claim was denied on the grounds that the Fourteenth
Amendment only protected procedural due process rights, and that economic liberties were thus
not included. See id. at 80–81.
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where the breakthrough of emancipation nominally precipitated a
dramatic expansion of the population that was afforded civil liberties, at
least by the Federal Government.23
While initially viewed as a procedural protection, the Due Process
Clause came to serve as the mechanism for defining new ideas “implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty.”24 As the doctrine of substantive due
process evolved over the course of the twentieth century, individuals
began to challenge the perception that fundamental liberties functioned
only as guarantees that the government could not infringe upon certain
rights of its citizens. With the abolition of slavery, the enfranchisement
of women, and the rapid expansion of the welfare state under the New
Deal, it was simply less realistic that a growing, wealthy nation could
remain committed to the narrow Bill of Rights, or at least decline to
expand what these essential rights included.25
This judicial right-making is not without extreme risks in the health
care context. When the government endeavors to assume more
responsibility for providing health care, it induces more reliance from
those provided for—a message clearly implicit in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius26 (discussed below).27 Subsequently,
the government will find it more difficult to back away from this
responsibility—even if no legal obligation actually exists. So far, the
Supreme Court has maintained strict active-passive and positive-negative
distinctions in health care rights.28 First, the Court has recognized bodily
autonomy and the right to privacy by finding a fundamental liberty
interest in the right to abortion and contraception.29 These are negative
liberties, preventing state and federal governments from interfering with
choice in reproductive care.30 Second, the Court has declined to recognize
a fundamental right to medical aid-in-dying, while upholding a right to
deny life-sustaining treatment.31 In these cases, the Court made a meansbased distinction that allowed passive means to hasten death, but upheld
bans on physician assistance.32 Finally, the Court has held that loss of
23. Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV.
1323, 1323–24 (1952).
24. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
25. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing, in
dissent, that in evaluating whether something is a fundamental right, the Court should consider
how society is breaking with tradition).
26. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
27. Infra Section I.C.
28. Infra Section I.B.
29. Infra Section I.A.
30. Infra Section I.A.
31. Infra Section I.B.
32. Infra Section I.B.
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Medicare funding under certain Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act (PPACA) provisions would be unconscionable.33 This decision
implicitly charted a basis for a right to health care when the government
has substantially induced reliance on it.
The idea of government liability resulting from induced reliance bears
substantial resemblance to the states’ liability to protect citizens when a
state has created danger.34 This latter concept of liability, considered
alongside substantive due process rights in health care—the right to
choice and bodily autonomy, the right to privacy, and the right to be free
from forced treatment—provides a framework for legally recognizing a
positive right to health care when the state creates harm through
mandatory medical intervention. This Note will argue that the Baby
AIDS Bill invokes these rights, and that in order to withstand scrutiny,
New York State must provide for long-term health care related to HIV
treatment in order to justify the constitutional complications and prevent
future harm to newborns who are treated under this regulation.
A. Abortion-Related Medical Rights Under Substantive Due Process
Though perhaps not evident at the time, the Supreme Court’s earliest
substantive due process decisions relating to contraception and abortion
have had strong implications for health care. The Court found a right to
privacy both necessary for ordered liberty and profoundly embedded in
our history and tradition, and also found that reproductive health care and
the decision to procreate were included in this right.35 The rights to choice
and privacy are inextricable from modern care, where patient consent and
the protection of health information are paramount in the doctor-patient
relationship.
Privacy as a fundamental right was first articulated in Olmstead v.
United States,36 a case involving a criminal conviction based on evidence
obtained illegally by wiretapping carried out by federal agents.37 Only
Justice Louis Brandeis found this invasion of privacy dangerous enough
to dissent.38 Speaking of the framers, he said: “They conferred, as against
the Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”39 This dissent was the

33. Infra Section I.C.
34. Infra Section I.D.
35. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)
(declaring a fundamental right to marital privacy that included the ability to seek contraception).
36. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
37. Id. at 455–57.
38. Id. at 471 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 478.
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springboard for a much more abstract notion of privacy nearly four
decades later in Griswold v. Connecticut.40
In Griswold, the Court demonstrated that one method of negotiating
new rights was finding ways to define them as implicit in existing ones.41
Griswold involved a Connecticut statute that prevented couples from
acquiring oral contraceptives, a law that a majority of the Supreme Court
found to be offensively intrusive to marital privacy42 and the concurrence
found to be pernicious to public health knowledge and education.43 Still,
the privacy right first conceived of in Olmstead,44 then solidified in
Griswold, was a negative right that prohibited rather than required
government action.
Following Griswold, in the early 1970s, citizens attempted to assert
rights they believed were implicit to ordered liberty in minimum
subsistence,45 housing,46 and education.47 The Court denied all of these,
indicating that while the judiciary was ready to consider that more rights
were fundamental than those explicitly stated in the Constitution, the
extent to which those rights were entitlements to governmental
guarantees significantly lessened the likelihood of recognition.48
Nowhere was this more evident than Roe v. Wade49 and its progeny,
where, over the next twenty years, the court increasingly recognized
rights of bodily autonomy and choice50 but limited the government’s

40. 381 U.S. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 483 (majority opinion). In this opinion, Justice William Douglas notably
introduced the current concept of the “penumbra” of rights that has become inextricable from the
substantive due process doctrine. Id. at 484. His identification of a right to privacy in declaring
unconstitutional a law preventing access to contraception was a watershed moment in identifying
and articulating other previously unrecognized rights.
42. Id. at 485–86. Justice Douglas famously questioned: “Would we allow the police to
search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The
very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.” Id.
43. Id. at 503 (White, J., concurring).
44. 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“They conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.”).
45. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 478–83 (1970). This case was decided on grounds
of equal protection, but nonetheless considered the right similarly when determining that
discriminatory classification could be justified by a mere rational basis. Id. at 483.
46. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
47. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
48. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35; Lindsey, 405 U.S. at 74; Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485.
49. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
50. See id. at 154; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 846 (1992) (affirming the right to an abortion recognized in Roe under a viability standard,
but allowing ancillary requirements to stand).
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obligation to facilitate abortion through federally funded programs.51 The
Roe decision was a balancing act of cognizable rights of mother and fetus
under the Constitution, striving to set bright-line trimester rules for
medically tenuous circumstances.52 The viability approach was largely a
matter of comity, with the Court stating, “the abortion decision in all its
aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic
responsibility for it must rest with the physician.”53
Subsequent contested abortion litigation resulted in the refinement of
the limits of the fundamental right and the reinforcement of viability
determinations.54 Presently, states are not allowed to impose an “undue
burden” on women seeking an abortion, but states are able to impose
limits once fetal viability is established.55 Roe stands as one of the first
substantive due process cases where the Supreme Court encountered
rights so closely entwined with contemporary notions of health care, and
the territory it secured has remained constant. Even in conservative repeal
efforts, proposals have often carved out exceptions for medically
necessary, post-viability abortions, further demarcating the government’s
territory of interest in leaving untouched certain realms of decisions
involving health-related issues.
Seven years after Roe, the Court drew clear lines in positive rights
jurisprudence and health care entitlements when it considered whether
federal medical insurance programs were required to pay for childbirth
or abortion in Harris v. McRae.56 In a narrow 5-4 decision, the Court
upheld the still contentious Hyde Amendment57 and decided that the
rights extrapolated in Roe did not confer on a woman “a constitutional
entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of
protected choices.”58 This split Court foreshadowed equivocation on the
future of recognizing rights related to self-determination in health care
and the government’s role in securing care. In Harris, the government
51. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) (denying a claim for Medicaid funding for
both childbirth and abortion on the grounds that the government is not required to subsidize any
medical care).
52. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–66.
53. B. Jessie Hill, Reproductive Rights as Health Care Rights, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
501, 508 (2009) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 166).
54. Casey, 505 U.S. at 869–70 (abandoning the rigid trimester approach established by
Roe); see also Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 156 (2007) (upholding a ban on partial-birth
abortion); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 515, 522 (1989) (upholding a
state statute requiring physicians to determine fetal viability prior to performing an abortion).
55. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
56. 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980).
57. At the time of writing this Note, there is currently legislation before Congress that would
make the ban on federal funding for abortion permanent. See No Taxpayer Funding for Abortion
Act, H.R. 7, 115th Cong. § 301 (2017).
58. Harris, 448 U.S. at 316.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 71, Iss. 2 [], Art. 6

578

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

asserted a sound rational basis in refusing to extend Medicaid coverage
to abortion.59 That basis was the history of negative liberties
jurisprudence, which had consistently held that while the government
cannot be the source of burden in exercising a right, the government has
no obligation to do anything about those obstacles it did not impose.60
Implicit in this reasoning is the suggestion that, no matter how expansive
negative liberties may be, it is possible that the government may, by an
affirmative act, create a duty to remove an obstacle it does create.
B. Health Care Rights Limited: No Right to Die
Roe and its progeny represent a progressive expansion of rights as
they relate to affirming bodily autonomy and self-determination, rooted
in a right to privacy. Paradoxically, due process rights rooted in privacy
are by definition devoid of government action and personal entitlement.
States, therefore, are only required to protect such rights, not facilitate
them.61 While there has been no shortage of challenges to the holding in
Roe and, more recently, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,62 the privacy interests recognized in these cases
remain guiding precedent and have secured a litany of other rights for
families and couples.63
In the health care context, however, the Court has demonstrated
inconsistencies in its approach to liberties in medical treatment,
particularly when the treatment is life-sustaining. The New Jersey
Supreme Court was the first court to seriously consider whether the
breadth of the right to privacy encompassed a right to refuse lifesustaining medical treatment. In In re Quinlan, Karen Ann Quinlan’s
parents asserted that artificial respiration was an extraordinary means of
preservation and petitioned to end the life-sustaining treatment.64 They
believed Quinlan should have a natural, passive death.65 The question
arose whether removing the respirator was equivalent to homicide.66 The
New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of Quinlan’s
59. Id.
60. Id. at 325.
61. See Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he Constitution
is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties.”).
62. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
63. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (conferring the
fundamental right to marry on same-sex couples); Windsor v. U.S., 570 U.S. 744, 774–75 (2013)
(applying federal benefits to same-sex unions); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)
(overruling the criminalization of same-sex sodomy in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986)).
64. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 657 (N.J. 1976).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 669–70.
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family,67 and five years later, the New York Court of Appeals rendered a
similar decision in In re Eichner68 with the added criteria of clear and
convincing evidence that the patient would not have wanted such lifesustaining treatment.69
In 1990, when the Supreme Court of the United States first considered
the issue in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,70 another
5-4 split left an additional tenuous holding in the sphere of health care
liberties.71 In Cruzan, the Court ruled in accordance with the court in
Eichner that clear and convincing evidence of patient preference was
needed to cease life-sustaining treatment for the patient in a persistent
vegetative state.72 The Court reached this decision by implicitly
upholding a recognized fundamental liberty interest in refusing lifesustaining treatment, but the narrow framing of the question resulted in
an opinion that only set forth a required standard of clear and convincing
evidence in cases where the patient is not competent to decline
treatment.73
If the Cruzan holding was not satisfactory to physicians and patients
seeking to articulate a right to assistance in ending life, the subsequent
attempts on equal protection grounds in Vacco v. Quill74 and on due
process grounds in Washington v. Glucksberg75 offered no greater
resolution. The Vacco Court, in addressing a New York State ban on
physician-assisted suicide, reasoned that the only guarantee of equal
protection was that similarly situated persons be treated similarly.76
Therefore, as long as all competent terminally ill people were both able
to refuse life-sustaining treatment and unable to receive treatment
hastening death, there was no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.77
In Glucksberg, the Court denied the right to die without equivocation in
a unanimous decision, finding a rational basis in Washington State’s
desire to preserve the integrity of the medical profession and in its
aversion to policies that supported euthanasia.78
While neither Cruzan, Vacco, nor Glucksberg declared any sort of
permanent ban on the medical right to die, in no case did the Justices find
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 669.
420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
Id. at 72.
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
Id. at 263.
Id. at 280.
Id. at 261, 283.
521 U.S. 793 (1997).
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
521 U.S. at 798–99.
Id.
521 U.S. at 728.
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that there was any national “history or tradition” to support this being
considered a right.79 Since then, however, seven states and the District of
Columbia have legislatively or judicially established a right to medical
aid-in-dying, indicating an emerging history of health care liberties at the
end of life.80
Medical aid-in-dying litigation illuminates a critical inconsistency in
the Supreme Court’s position on the nature of fundamental rights it
recognizes in health care. The ruling that a competent terminally ill
patient may not invoke the help of a physician in hastening death is nearly
untenable when the Court has also said that a person may choose the
passive means of hastening death by refusing treatment.81 This position
reflects a history of negative rights jurisprudence, under which the
government may not require a citizen to accept life-sustaining treatment
without committing battery.82 Had the government required acceptance
of treatment, it almost certainly would have created an entitlement to
subsidized health care for all, lest economically disadvantaged citizens
be unable to comply.
Scholars have framed the dispute regarding medical aid-in-dying as a
conflict of perceived “self-sovereignty” derived from both the Fourteenth
Amendment and broader policy concerns regarding the sanctity of life
and potential abuses.83 Proponents of the current policy cast Chief Justice
William Rehnquist’s rulings in Vacco and Glucksberg as grounded in an
incisive distinction of intent, quoting the Chief Justice’s analysis that
there is a significant legal difference “between a person who knows that
another person will be killed as the result of his conduct and a person who
acts with the specific purpose of taking another’s life.”84 This analysis
hardly resolves the inconsistency at any essential level, but it does
indicate that the degree to which a right is positive—that is, the extent to
which a right demands government action—is perhaps less determinative
than it once was.
Others have argued that Glucksberg phrased the issue narrowly as a
matter of convenience, even though the essence of the right in question—
the right to bodily autonomy—was well established and well protected
79. See, e.g., id. (“The history of the law’s treatment of assisted suicide in this country has
been and continues to be one of the rejection of nearly all efforts to permit it.”).
80. Take
Action: States
with Dignity
Laws,
DEATH WITH DIGNITY,
https://www.deathwithdignity.org/take-action/ [https://perma.cc/AQB6-GYFH] (last updated
Nov. 12, 2018) [https://perma.cc/B37D-PHZF].
81. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 725.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., Neil M. Gorsuch, The Right to Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 23 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 614–15 (2000).
84. Id. (quoting Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 802 (1997)).
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by the time medical aid-in-dying surfaced in the courts.85 Rehnquist’s
analysis was based on an exceptionally strict application of the “history
and tradition” element of fundamental rights, leading to the conclusion
that there had been only a history of rejecting suicide in any form.86 This
factor, of course, is only part of the consideration in determining whether
a fundamental right exists, but substantive due process doctrine has
routinely shown that history and tradition are subject to rapid changes in
opinion.87 The Supreme Court has already recognized, to some degree,
that the federal government’s subsidization of health care has become
inextricable from the national health system, indicating at least the
nascence of an emerging tradition.
C. Government Obligation and the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act
Most recently, the Supreme Court indicated in National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius88 that it is not wholly blind to an
emerging history and tradition of state-sponsored health care when it
struck down the Medicaid expansion requirements in the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).89 Congress cited to the
taxing and spending power as its basis of authority for this provision of
the PPACA.90 However, the Supreme Court ruled that requiring the
significant expenditures associated with Medicaid expansion were
beyond the scope of Congress’s power because it gave states an
unimaginable ultimatum: expand Medicaid or lose the federal Medicaid
subsidy.91 Strongly implicit in the Court’s ruling is the conclusion that
the government, by its own creation, funding, and maintenance of
subsidized health care, has induced such substantial reliance on Medicaid

85. Erwin Chemerinsky, Washington v. Glucksberg Was Tragically Wrong, 106 MICH. L.
REV. 1501, 1505 (2008).
86. Id.
87. See the discussion of Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) in Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Undignified: The Supreme Court, Racial Justice, and Dignity Claims, 69 FLA. L.
REV. 1, 9 (2017). When history and tradition are cited as grounds for a decision, particularly in
justifying an especially conservative ruling, it often mobilizes advocacy efforts that spur the
emergence of new tradition. Such was the case between 1986, when Bowers upheld anti-sodomy
laws, and 2003, when the Supreme Court overturned its decision in Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas.
Id.
88. 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
89. Id. at 585.
90. Jack M. Beermann, NFIB v. Sebelius and the Right to Health Care: Government’s
Obligation to Provide for the Health, Safety, and Welfare of Its Citizens, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 277, 284 (2015).
91. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 585.
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services that conditional spending tied to drastic changes to Medicaid was
unconscionable.92
The relationship between the provision of health care and fundamental
rights remains uncertain. By rejecting the penalty to states that declined
to expand Medicaid, the Sebelius decision casts a shadow on earlier cases
that enshrine the negative framing of the Constitution.
D. State Protection and the Haven of Positive Rights
There are few places in common law where positive rights and
extraordinary affirmative duties are found. Tort law does not hold the
nonfeasor liable, nor does criminal law punish the passive observer of a
homicide (unless some duty is created or exists).93 Some tenets of
contract law alone, wherein citizens can seek support from the judiciary
in enforcing things contracted for, suggest positive rights.94 American
legal traditions are saturated with proscriptive rules that tell individuals
and institutions (including the state and federal governments) what they
cannot do, not what they must do.95
State protection of citizens from violence against one another may be
characterized as the most fundamental purpose of government,96 but the
Supreme Court has routinely declined to impose this duty on the state.97
The DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services98
opinion remains one of the most influential decisions in charting out the
extent of government obligations to prevent private wrongs. DeShaney
thereby conceptualizes a positive right to state protection, although the
92. Beermann, supra note 90, at 287. Beermann observes: “The expectation that
government will provide medical care for those who cannot afford it is so ingrained in the mind
of Americans that while adjustments can be made in light of changing policy and available
resources, wholesale abandonment of the duty is unthinkable.” Id.
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965) (“The duties
of one who merely omits to act are more restricted, and in general are confined to situations where
there is a special relation between the actor and the other which gives rise to [a] duty.”); Alison
McIntyre, Guilty Bystanders? On the Legitimacy of Duty to Rescue Statutes, 23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
157, 157 (1994) (“In most jurisdictions in the United States, if you fail to assist or obtain assistance
for a stranger in grave peril when you could do so easily and without significant risk to yourself,
your conduct does not constitute even a minor criminal offense.”).
94. Currie, supra note 4, at 874.
95. See Michael J. DeBoer, Legislating Morality Progressively—The Contraceptive
Coverage Mandate, Religious Freedom, and Public Health Policy and Ethics, 28 J.L. & HEALTH
62, 84 n.144 (2015) (“Government is held solely to what courts characterize as a negative
obligation: to refrain from acts that deprive citizens of protected rights.”).
96. David A. Strauss, Due Process, Government Inaction, and Private Wrongs, 1989 SUP.
CT. REV. 53, 53.
97. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200
(1989).
98. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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Court did not explicitly hold such a right was invoked in that case.99 The
case involved severe abuse of a young child, Joshua DeShaney, by his
father, who had sole custody.100 DeShaney was treated multiple times for
abuse-related injuries, and a social worker from the Department of Social
Services comprehensively detailed suspicions that DeShaney’s father
was abusing him.101 The Department took no action and eventually the
abuse grew so severe that DeShaney was beaten into a coma and left with
lifelong traumatic brain injuries.102 His mother sued in a § 1983 action,
but the Supreme Court declined to recognize that the Department had an
obligation to protect DeShaney since he was in his father’s care.103 The
Court distinguished this case from other cases where the Court had found
a right to state protection, namely in the context of wards—typically
either incarcerated individuals104 or individuals in the state foster care
system.105 A majority opinion did not secure state immunity in DeShaney,
and Chief Justice Rehnquist, who also authored the Glucksberg opinion,
took care to maintain the active-passive distinction when suggesting what
would invoke the requirement of some affirmative protective action by
the state.106 DeShaney established that physical custody by the
government and risk created by the government would necessitate
government protection.107
DeShaney has not withstood exception, however. Since this decision
in 1989, federal courts have grappled with whether state protection
should be required when either a special relationship with the state or a
state-created danger is present, or more narrowly, when both are
present.108 Across circuits, there are limited instances where an individual
has successfully brought a § 1983 action for the deprivation of liberty in
the state protection context. Stemler v. City of Florence109 is one notable
successful example. There, the court relied on the dicta in DeShaney and
analogous cases to support a reversal of the district court’s ruling that
police officers did not deprive decedent Conni Black of her liberty when
99. Id. at 200.
100. Id. at 191.
101. Id. at 192–93.
102. Id. at 193.
103. Id. at 193–94.
104. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (finding that a state prison had
violated the Eighth Amendment by demonstrating deliberate indifference to the serious medical
needs of an incarcerated individual).
105. Strauss, supra note 96, at 55.
106. Erwin Chemerinksy, The State-Created Danger Doctrine, 23 TOURO L. REV. 1, 3
(2007).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 3–4.
109. 126 F.3d 856 (6th Cir. 1997).
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they forced her to leave the scene with her abuser.110 In Black’s situation,
custody was certain, but the Stemler court went out of its way to note the
emerging existence of a duty of care when the state has merely created a
risk of harm without the individual being in custody (that is, being a
ward).111
The Stemler court used the dicta from Gazette v. City of Pontiac112 to
characterize the creation of this duty: “[A] duty to protect can arise in a
noncustodial setting if the state does anything to render an individual
more vulnerable to danger.”113 The Sixth Circuit’s articulation of the
state-created danger doctrine in Stemler was a powerful starting point for
the development of a plaintiff-friendly theory of liability, and since then,
some courts have conformed the test more closely to traditional notions
of tort liability by calling the state actor the “but-for” cause of the harm.114
Circuits have offered various tests for the state-created danger doctrine,
though requirements for plaintiffs to prove that the government action
“shocks the conscience” or put the plaintiff at greater risk than the general
public problematize the tests to the point of nullity.115
Among the areas of constitutionality implicated by the laws and
regulations that this Note will proceed to discuss, state protection’s
shaping of positive rights jurisprudence is perhaps the most influential
and certainly the most unsettled. The Baby AIDS Bill exists at an
intersection of Supreme Court doctrine, creating challenging questions
about the primacy of certain liberty interests, potential harms created by
health care intervention, and the statutory allowance—and requirement—
of actions that violate personal autonomy and may create a danger to
infants born with HIV. If the Bill is to survive the scrutiny that many have
argued it should be subjected to regarding liberty interests, it is necessary
to answer the question of whether New York has created the type of harm
protected against by the Constitution by failing to provide permanent
health care for infants who are born HIV positive and treated from
birth.116
110. Id. at 866–70.
111. Id. at 868.
112. 41 F.3d 1061, 1065 (6th Cir. 1994).
113. Stemler, 126 F.3d at 868 (quoting Gazette, 41 F.3d at 1065).
114. Chemerinksy, supra note 106, at 10. Chemerinsky identifies Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d
905 (10th Cir. 2011) as one of the most pro-plaintiff decisions. Id. He posits that if cases like
DeShaney had been decided under the Currier test, liability for the government would have been
much easier to prove. Id.
115. Id. at 15–17.
116. See Gina A. Angelleta, New York Public Health Law § 2500-F: The Hand That Robbed
the Cradle of Privacy, 18 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 175, 177 (2003); Kelly D. Bryce,
Mandatory HIV Testing of Newborns: Is There a Better Way to Achieve the State’s Goal of
Preventing Transmission of HIV to Newborns and Ensuring them Treatment, 4 QUINNIPIAC
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II. THE HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK BABY AIDS BILL
The genesis of HIV/AIDS in the United States is memorialized mostly
by vague journalistic pieces and the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention’s (CDC) Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report. Some
journalistic accounts have attempted to weave these together to
reconstruct the narrative through the limited and confusing facts available
from the early days of the epidemic.117 Public health data from that time
indicate that San Francisco, New York, and, to a lesser extent, Los
Angeles were the settings where significant numbers of gay men started
showing up in hospitals with Kaposi’s sarcoma lesions and obliterated
immune systems.118 It was not long before other populations, including
intravenous drug users, Haitian immigrants, hemophiliacs, and infants,
began to demonstrate similar symptoms.119 Thus, an epidemic was born.
A. The Evolution of the Baby AIDS Bill
By 1984, medical researchers knew with relative certainty that HIV
was the cause of AIDS.120 Within a year, the public health community
had devised some methods for preventing transmission through diagnosis
awareness, tailored to the most affected populations.121 Without financial
support from the federal government, municipalities barely managed to
provide care and slow the spread of an unbridled epidemic through
aggressive public health strategies.122

HEALTH L.J. 69, 69 (2000); Erin Nicholson, Mandatory HIV Testing of Pregnant Women: Public
Health Policy Considerations and Alternatives, 9 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 175, 176 (2002).
117. See generally RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, THE PEOPLE, AND
THE AIDS EPIDEMIC (1987). Shilts’s journalistic composition is one of the most comprehensive
histories of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, detailing the contributions of the major scientists,
public health officials, politicians, and activists during the early years of AIDS.
118. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH AIDS INST., supra note 10, at 1.
119. See id. at 3.
120. Robert C. Gallo & Luc Montagnier, Retrospective: The Discovery of HIV as the Cause
of AIDS, 349 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 2283, 2284 (2003).
121. Id.
122. E.g., Peter S. Arno, The Nonprofit Sector’s Response to the AIDS Epidemic:
Community-Based Services in San Francisco, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1325, 1325–26 (1986). The
earliest responses in San Francisco to the AIDS epidemic were from volunteer and nonprofit
organizations, like the Shanti Project and San Francisco AIDS Foundation. Id. Their main focus
was providing comfort care and emotional support, but educational programs were implemented
to share what little was known about preventing HIV infection. Id. For a similar perspective on
the gay men’s health crisis in New York City, see Suzanne C. Ouellette Kobasa, AIDS and
Volunteer Associations: Perspectives on Social and Individual Change, 68 MILBANK Q. 280, 280–
84 (1990).
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Among these strategies was the mandatory blind testing of newborns
for HIV.123 The blind testing requirement, a CDC-endorsed method by
which doctors and public health scientists were exclusively seeking to
monitor the prevalence of HIV in the general population, offered no
mechanism to specifically identify HIV-positive infants and mothers.124
In the forty-three states where the CDC funded this practice, the
prevailing health policy favored protecting confidentiality and privacy
rights, despite concerns that doctors were missing an opportunity to
connect newborns and their mothers to care.125 The theory seemed to be
that confidential and blind testing was better than no testing at all. If
rampant stigmatization of the gay community had taught health officials
anything, it was that confidentiality was necessary for even voluntary
testing programs to be successful, let alone mandatory ones.126 Still, this
meant that even though the likelihood of vertical transmission of HIV
was relatively low compared to other means of transmission,127 children
with a positive serostatus and unknown prognosis were being sent home
to HIV-positive mothers—without either knowing they carried the virus.
The confidentiality of the testing requirements did not go
unchallenged. Throughout the early 1990s, a vocal contingency led by
Assemblywoman Nettie Mayersohn saw confidentiality as a roadblock to
actively saving the lives of women and children.128 Mayersohn
recognized the inequitable outcome of voluntary and blind testing
policies wherein women and children were kept from knowing critical
health information, seemingly in order to protect the identity of male
partners.129 Beginning in 1993, Mayersohn spearheaded an amendment
to the public health code that would unblind the testing requirement.130
123. Kristin E. Schleiter, Testing Newborns for HIV, 11 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 969, 969–
70 (2009).
124. Mayersohn, supra note 11.
125. Id.
126. David Abramson, Passing the Test: New York’s Newborn HIV Testing Policy, 1987–
1997, in REDUCING THE ODDS: PREVENTING PERINATAL TRANSMISSION OF HIV IN THE UNITED
STATES 313, 316 (Michael A. Stoto et al. eds., 1999), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/
NBK230554/ [https://perma.cc/VXE2-DXVB].
127. Marie-Louise Newell, Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission of HIV: Challenges
for the Current Decade, 79 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 1138, 1138–39 (2001). All children born
to HIV-positive mothers will test positive for HIV at birth because babies inherit their mother’s
immune systems and thereby inherit the HIV antibodies. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note
13. However, approximately sixty to eighty-five percent of babies will not themselves become
HIV-positive after about one-and-a-half to two years. Newell, supra, at 1138. The rate of actual
vertical (also called perinatal and Mother-to-Child or MTC) transmission is inversely correlated
to the prevalence of breastfeeding. Id.
128. Abramson, supra note 126, at 326.
129. Id. at 326–27.
130. Mayersohn, supra note 11.
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What ensued was a contest of social, political, and scientific ideologies
that were constantly influenced by changes in knowledge about the nature
of and treatment for HIV.131
From 1994 to 1996, it seemed that Mayersohn’s uncompromising
position would have to make some concessions in light of lacking support
and well-founded arguments from proponents of strictly voluntary
unblind testing.132 However, party shifts in Congress, a landscape change
in federal support of AIDS programs,133 and political uncertainty in the
New York State legislature dramatically altered the priorities for the New
York Assembly.134 This afforded Mayersohn the changes needed to pass
the amended public health statute that would allow the implementation
of mandatory unblind HIV testing of newborn children.135 Governor
George Pataki signed the Bill into law on June 26, 1996, and Public
Health Commissioner Barbara DuBuono implemented the Bill, through
regulations, on February 1, 1997, as part of the Comprehensive Newborn
Testing Program.136
In the 1990s, desperation and fear that the epidemic would never
sufficiently abate made HIV/AIDS policies inherently exceptional in the
fashion in which they were adopted, the vigor with which they were
crafted, and the rules they sometimes broke. On the most practical level,
Mayersohn’s grassroots political campaign for an important public health
issue appeared to be an appeal to common sense and good health care
ethics. Thus, when Mayersohn’s amendment was passed and
implemented under New York Public Health Law § 2500-f, the
mandatory unblind screening requirement took hold with little thought
from the legislators about the implications for constitutional rights
beyond those of confidentiality and privacy.
B. The Constitutional Conundrum of the Baby AIDS Bill
The law as implemented by DuBuono currently requires the testing of
all newborn children in New York State, and the results must be
131. Abramson, supra note 126, at 328–35.
132. Id. at 331, 333.
133. See generally D. Parham & R. Conviser, A Brief History of the Ryan White CARE Act
in the USA and Its Implications for Other Countries, 14 AIDS CARE S3, S4, S6 (2002). The
mandatory testing of newborns was an anticipated requirement for states to receive Ryan White
CARE Act funding upon its reauthorization in 1996. Id. States and urban centers alike, especially
New York State, desperately needed this safety net funding to cover the costs of treatment and
access to care, and thus many of the Ryan White mandates put an end to any discussion amongst
state legislatures. Id.
134. Abramson, supra note 126, at 335.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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communicated to the mother.137 Of course, communicating the result of
a positive serostatus is tantamount to telling a mother that she, too, is
HIV-positive, a fact that she may or may not have known prior to giving
birth or even conceiving.138 The law also lists numerous duties of the
“responsible physician,” including “provid[ing] or arrang[ing] for health
care, case management and other social services as needed for the
newborn.”139 The constitutional concerns implicated by § 2500-f have
been litigated and challenged on right-to-privacy grounds since the law’s
inception, but most of the litigation has been limited to confidentiality
and autonomy issues regarding the mother.140
In mandating action contingent upon a positive HIV-test, the public
health statute creates an obligation for care with few analogs found
elsewhere in the law. Facially, it is unconstitutional, violating the rights
of parents as the health care decisionmakers for their children. A
mandatory test matched with mandatory treatment was a sensible public
health strategy in 1996, but lawmakers could scarcely have anticipated
all that scientists would discover about living with HIV, namely because
living with HIV was tenuous at best.
Since the Bill was passed, medical researchers have learned much
about living with, mitigating the effects of, and dramatically reducing the
likelihood of vertically transmitting HIV.141 Currently, since HIV can
only be managed and generally not cured, an HIV-positive individual is
subject to lifelong therapy in order to reach a normal life expectancy.142
People living with HIV are treated with a regimen of antiretroviral drugs
that can have harmful long-term effects on the body’s immune,
endocrine, and excretory systems.143 The virus may also develop
immunity to an antiretroviral, particularly when treatment is
discontinuous or interrupted.144 It is this latter quality of developed
resistance that makes the Baby AIDS Bill such a uniquely situated public
health statute, rife with constitutional questions that concern both positive
and negative liberties.
The Baby AIDS Bill can be analyzed by looking at its two constituent
elements: testing and treatment. By mandating testing and treatment,
137. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 69-1.5 (2018).
138. See Angelleta, supra note 116, at 195–96.
139. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 69-1.5.
140. See, e.g., Angelleta, supra note 116, at 202, 204.
141. See generally HIV Treatment: The Basics, NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, https://aidsinfo.nih.
gov/understanding-hiv-aids/fact-sheets/21/51/hiv-treatment--the-basics [https://perma.cc/TKP34E6S] (last updated Mar. 22, 2018).
142. See Olsen et al., supra note 16, at 101–02.
143. Andrew Carr and David A. Cooper, Adverse Effects of Antiretroviral Therapy, 356
LANCET 1423, 1425–28 (2000).
144. Olsen et al., supra note 16, at 101–02.
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physicians are authorized and required, on the one hand, to subject infants
to testing regardless of parental consent. This screening is itself a practice
that raises constitutional concerns about violating bodily autonomy and
parental rights in child rearing.145 It also deprives both mother and child
of privacy rights without due process of law by ultimately disclosing the
personal health information of no less than two individuals.146 On this
prong, however, the government would likely be able to articulate a
compelling interest with no less restrictive means available; testing
newborns for HIV is essential in addressing early health concerns of the
baby and protecting public health at large.147
If the outcome of the testing indicates that the child has HIV, the
regulation corollary to the Bill requires the physician to disclose the
results and actively initiate care.148 The duty Public Health Law § 2500f imposes on physicians establishes a state requirement anathema to the
Supreme Court’s doctrine on fundamental health care rights and is nearly
alone in actively making physicians treat an individual. Under this
regulation, New York is taking an affirmative action to subject an
individual to life-prolonging treatment—an action directly at odds with
medical aid-in-dying decisions and violative of the laws that protect
against forceful acceptance of treatment.149 The administration of
antiretroviral drugs to an infant without consent, parental or otherwise, is
conceivably battery and quite possibly deprivation of liberty without due
process. If this law were challenged, it is likely that a court could not
simultaneously agree to protect the fundamental right of families to rear
their children as they please,150 to deny the fundamental right of
terminally ill patients to physician-assisted suicide,151 and to affirm the

145. Angelleta, supra note 116, at 195–96.
146. Valerie S. Prater, Confidentiality, Privacy, and Security of Health Information:
Balancing Interests, UNIV. ILL. CHI. (Dec. 8, 2014), https://healthinformatics.uic.edu/resources/
articles/confidentiality-privacy-and-security-of-health-information-balancing-interests/
[https://perma.cc/LTG4-HZM4]. Some have drawn a distinction in the health care context
between “privacy” and “confidentiality,” identifying the latter as the more appropriate
consideration in the context of personal health information. See, e.g., id. This is due to the lesser
degree of privilege necessary to allow for the functional sharing of health information in
furtherance of treatment. Id.
147. WORLD HEALTH ORG., EARLY DETECTION OF HIV IN INFANTS AND CHILDREN 1–2
(2007), http://www.who.int/hiv/paediatric/EarlydiagnostictestingforHIVVer_Final_May07.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5V34-TRVL].
148. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 69-1.5 (2018).
149. See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808–09 (1997).
150. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (holding that children could not
be required to attend public schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (discussing
parents’ liberty to raise their children and control their education).
151. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997).
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more sweeping and broadly defined right to privacy152 while still
allowing the treatment mandate to exist. The Baby AIDS Bill draws a red
line through some of the most deeply rooted substantive due process
protections, creating a constitutionally offensive policy of treatment and
giving rise to circumstances prone to civil liability under state-created
danger.
In the immediate aftermath of the regulation, reports from HIVpositive mothers confirmed some of the fears that opponents of the Bill
had voiced.153 While Mayersohn continued to cast the Baby AIDS Bill as
progressive protection of the health care rights of children, she denied,
despite the language of the regulation implementing the law, that it was
medication enforcement.154 However, this proved to play out differently
in the health care setting. One mother reported that she encountered
doctor after doctor who threatened her with loss of custody if she refused
treatment for her HIV-positive infant.155 This mother also noted the fears
another physician expressed about losing his license.156 Caught between
these two responses at a time when HIV treatment and its long-term
effects were much less understood, treatment was at least implicitly
mandatory, even if physicians managed to escape or evade a strict
application of the regulation.
It is not a great legal leap to characterize HIV treatment much as the
court characterized abortion in Roe: as a medical decision, the
responsibility of which fundamentally rests with the physician.157 The
Court chose in Roe to refrain from interfering with health care decisions,
and in doing so, protected the government from setting policy that would
require additional government resources to properly facilitate.158 But the
law in this case removes the decisional component that would
traditionally be associated with in utero or post-partum health care. The
physician must test the infant, and if the infant is positive, the physician
must provide or arrange for care.159 In creating these requirements, the
152. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961).
153. Celia Farber, AIDS: Words from the Front, SPIN, Dec. 1996, at 127.
154. Id. at 128.
155. Id. at 162.
156. Id.
157. Hill, supra note 53 (quoting the majority opinion in Roe v. Wade).
158. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153–54 (1973).
159. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 69-1.5 (2018). The language of the regulation
is somewhat unclear: “in the case of newborns who test positive for HIV antibodies” the
“responsible physician shall . . . provide or arrange for health care, case management and other
social services as needed for the newborn.” Id. This could suggest that the responsible physician
is required to engage in some kind of active treatment. But the Bill goes on to require that the
physician “refer the mother and newborn to an HIV specialized care center for provision of the
services required.” Id.
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New York legislature deviated from the typical approach of enacting usch
a change through the judiciary; instead, it made a duty of care a part of
the state’s public health law and abrogated the authority of the medical
profession, which served as one of the primary compelling interests in
rejecting the right to physician-assisted suicide in Glucksberg.160 It is
prudent for the legislature and judiciary to leave medical decisions
between a doctor and a patient given the individualized nature of care
plans. While population health is a critical component of ensuring better
quality of life for individuals, many administrative and regulatory
agencies161 are equipped to develop these policies. Accordingly, the
courts and legislature serve only to check these executive measures.
When the government avoids legislating medical care, it also steers clear
of mandating treatment that could subject the government to liability
under constitutional and tort causes of action.
Despite the lengthy history of contrary constitutional law and practical
arguments, New York’s requirement for testing and treatment still carries
the force of law today. Facially, and even empirically, this Bill provides
a social good in some sense.162 The universality of the testing requirement
diminishes barriers to accessing diagnostic care, and in the years
following the Bill, more than 230,000 infants were tested, resulting in the
identification of nearly 1,000 infants with HIV.163 Still, the Constitution
is not framed to protect social goods, and even when it does so
incidentally, the extent to which something is “good” is often more a
matter of politics than morals.164 From its genesis, just as the Baby AIDS
Bill has been lauded as a public health and children’s rights victory, it has
been indicted as an affront to the women’s health care rights secured in
Roe.165
But now that it has passed, what alternative is there? In one sense, to
not test would be to deprive the child of a chance at an HIV-free life if
the child had indeed contracted HIV in utero. This chance is only secured
by interpreting the regulation’s mandate as an affirmative requirement to
test and treat, and as discussed, the treatment aspect is the most squarely
160. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 731 (1997).
161. See, e.g., HHS Offices and Agencies, COMMISSIONED CORPS U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV.
(Dec. 30, 2017), https://www.usphs.gov/aboutus/agencies/hhs.aspx [https://perma.cc/RF6YGK2X].
162. Abramson, supra note 126, at 337.
163. Id. Ten percent of these mothers did not know they were HIV-positive while pregnant,
and seventy-seven were referred back to local health departments for follow-up care. Id. The
testing requirement, strictly speaking, did inform a significant number of women of a major health
issue that could have been fatal without treatment. Id.
164. Steven Strasnick, Individual Rights and the Social Good: A Choice-Theoretic Analysis,
10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 415, 416 (1982).
165. See Angelleta, supra note 116, at 206–08.
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at odds with the bulk of Supreme Court doctrine prohibiting the
enforcement of life-sustaining treatment and protecting bodily autonomy.
Yet, to test and not initiate treatment could mean sending a child home to
die during the first year of life.166 Case law is clear that a child, even one
in utero at a certain point in gestation, has a fundamental interest in the
right to life that is traditionally balanced against the mother’s rights.167
Therefore, the State’s protection of the interest in the infant’s right to life
as articulated in Roe and refined in Casey168 is only possible if the court
exercises a degree of blindness to the holdings of Glucksberg and
Vacco,169 or else gives one of these interests precedence.
C. HIV Treatment as Danger Without Protection
The fact that a newborn can begin her life terminally ill is a tragedy of
biology. Despite significant advances in medical science, some
conditions present at birth remain incurable. Fortunately, HIV is
generally manageable with a strict regimen of medication.170
Nonetheless, a baby born with HIV and unable to receive treatment is
essentially terminally ill. Under Glucksberg, Cruzan, and Quill, forcing
a child to receive life-sustaining treatment is inapposite to the doctrine
protecting individuals from harm at the hands of a state law.171
The most dangerous outcome of these policies is the newborn testing
positive for HIV, being connected to care and administered antiretroviral
drugs, and then being treated inconsistently over the course of her life.
This is especially likely given systemic health care inequities that show a
strong inverse correlation between income and access to care, and HIV
prevalence.172 If treatment is interrupted, it has the potential to be less
effective for the duration of the infant’s life as the virus develops
166. See David Dunn, Short-Term Risk of Disease Progression in HIV-1-Infected Children
Receiving No Antiretroviral Therapy or Zidovudine Monotherapy: A Meta-Analysis, 362 LANCET
1605, 1605 (2003).
167. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
168. Id.
169. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 809 (1997) (holding that laws prohibiting physician
assisted suicide did not violate equal protection); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702, 728 (1997) (declining to recognize a fundamental right to die).
170. HIV Treatment: The Basics, supra note 141.
171. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728; Vacco, 521 U.S. at 809; Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990).
172. Anna Satcher Johnson et al., Monitoring Selected National HIV Prevention and Care
Objectives by Using HIV Surveillance Data: United States and 6 Dependent Areas, 21 HIV
SURVEILLANCE REP. 1, 8–10 (2014). African-Americans experience much higher rates of HIV and
vertical transmission, but generally experience more access barriers to health care. Id. Thus,
newborns in this community are more likely to be born with HIV, but less likely to be able to
obtain treatment for it. See id.
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resistance over time without being sufficiently repressed.173 The action
mandated by the statute can therefore be construed as state action that
requires the infant to receive health care, which must be continuous,
uninterrupted, and comprehensive, for the chronic issues associated with
HIV.174 Without this standard of care, it is possible that the statutory
requirements—which already subject the infant to the battery found
unlawful in Glucksberg—can deprive the infant of the chance of longterm successful viral repression. Short-term intervention will prolong the
life of the child, but only continuous therapy will allow for a normal life.
One solution, then, is to characterize the treatment component as statecreated danger that creates government liability under one of the tests
recognized by a circuit court.175 There are conceptual hurdles to framing
medical treatment as harm, since the fundamental goal is to prolong life
or improve the quality of remaining life. But this definition of health care
assumes consent, and it does not necessarily anticipate the unique
contours of illnesses such as HIV. In the case of vertically transmitted
HIV, the lack of consent makes the absence of guaranteed care more
problematic, since the child will be forced to maintain therapy—therapy
the state may not provide—for successful viral repression.
Consent, ostensibly by the mother who has the power to make health
care decisions for her child,176 is not explicitly required in the Baby AIDS
Bill, and the reading espoused by this Note shows that the duty is placed
on the physician.177 Without consent, health care transitions from a
willful patient-physician relationship, where the patient is waiving certain
rights (including constitutionally protected ones, like privacy), to an
imposed treatment that may place the individual in danger. This lack of
consent is essential to fully conceptualizing the harm. While it is well
settled that minors generally are not afforded the right to make their own
health care decisions, the New York Baby AIDS regulation makes no
accommodation for the statutory power of consent afforded to mothers.178
173. Olsen et al., supra note 16, at 102–03.
174. HIV Treatment: The Basics, supra note 141.
175. Chemerinksy, supra note 106, at 15–17.
176. Alireza Parasapoor, Autonomy of Children and Adolescents in Consent to Treatment:
Ethical, Jurisprudential, and Legal Considerations, 24 IRAN. J. PEDIATRICS 241, 243 (2014).
Globally, the age of majority differs for various social, cultural and religious reasons. See id.
Nonetheless, physicians in all countries will encounter situations where they are asked to treat or
faced with treating a child without parental consent. This is more difficult in the United States,
where the circumstances under which a minor may unilaterally make health care decisions are
extremely limited. Id.
177. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 69-1.5 (2018) (“The responsible physician
shall[,] . . . in the case of newborns who test positive for HIV antibodies[,] . . . provide or arrange
for health care . . . .” (emphasis added)).
178. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504 (McKinney 2017).
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Both HIV-positive women and children—though practically benefiting
from temporary access to care—suffer greatly in terms of the rights that
are compromised by this legislation.
The circuit courts have provided various tests for assessing statecreated dangers, which borrow in varying degrees from the DeShaney
decision.179 The cases have traditionally addressed physical, and often
criminal, violence that the state fails to prevent.180 However, the harm or
danger in the case of the Baby AIDS Bill is no less threatening if the
government is not also guaranteeing individuals lifelong care. Hart v.
City of Little Rock181 offers one model for perceiving forced treatment
without guaranteed care as a state-created danger, the application of
which would first require an articulation of the harm.182 As seen in both
the health care liberties and state protection contexts, it is often the
narrowness of the framing that either assists in garnering recognition by
the Supreme Court or in disposing of the right altogether.183 Here, the
liberty is narrow by nature, applying only to a small population of HIVpositive infants in New York State. The state creates danger by requiring
physicians to treat HIV-positive infants without providing for and
ensuring the continued availability of care and treatment, thus placing the
infants at a greater risk of resistance to treatment.184 The danger is that
antiretroviral therapies will be less effective if the individual loses access
to care as a condition of indigency or economic hardship or as a result of
the inability of parents to provide care.
The Baby AIDS Bill falls squarely within the confines of a statecreated danger as defined by the test described in Hart. First, the plaintiff

179. Chemerinksy, supra note 106, at 16–17. The current tests for state-created danger set a
high bar for a cause of action. The plaintiff must often be able to show extreme recklessness or
deliberate indifference. Id. The likelihood of a court ever finding deliberate indifference in a
widespread public health policy would be politically pernicious, further underscoring why there
is a history of refraining from judicial interference with the medical profession.
180. See generally id. (discussing some of the most recent cases in the Supreme Court and
Federal Circuit Courts that have dealt with the issue of state-created danger, those most influential
in shaping the doctrine involve physical violence and criminal offenses). This should not preclude
the doctrine’s application to the Baby AIDS Bill, since the harm created is still a type of battery.
181. 432 F.3d 801 (8th Cir. 2005).
182. Id. at 805.
183. Understand Medical Aid in Dying, COMPASSION & CHOICES (Dec. 30, 2017),
https://www.compassionandchoices.org/understand-medical-aid-in-dying/ [https://perma.cc/
RHK3-4X84]. Seven states now have laws allowing medical aid-in-dying. Id. Advocacy
organizations like Compassion and Choices distinguish between “medical aid in dying” and
“assisted suicide.” Id.
184. HIV Treatment: The Basics, supra note 141.
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must be a member of a precisely defined group.185 The focus of the Baby
AIDS Bill and implementing regulation applies only to the relatively
small group of children who test positive for HIV at birth, and the harm
is typically only present for those who continue to test positive after
eighteen months to two years, since that generally indicates vertical
transmission of the virus. Narrowness is sufficient. Second, the state
conduct must be shown to put this group in “serious, immediate, and
proximate harm.”186 Antiretroviral therapy (ART) resistance is medically
serious, and given that a failure to respond to treatment could be fatal in
a year’s time, the harm is reasonably immediate in the health care
context.187 Additionally, treatment resistance can only be caused by
intervention, which makes the post-natal treatment the only proximate
harm. Third, the risk must be “obvious or known” to the government.188
It is widely known in the medical community that discontinuous care can
result in drug resistance to ART.189 Fourth, Hart requires that the act was
done with a conscious disregard of a high degree of risk—a particularly
high standard in civil tort suits.190 Other circuits have similarly applied a
deliberate indifference standard.191 Either would appear challenging in
the case of the Baby AIDS Bill to establish in the legal context, since the
Bill is quite the opposite of reckless disregard in its final intent. However,
there is a high degree of risk of developing resistance when the infant
receiving care is neither responsible for his own treatment nor able to
control the continuity of care. Without guaranteeing access to care to the
extent that it may, the government must question whether it should be
requiring treatment at all.192 Thus, the reckless disregard of the potential
consequences of this regulation is clear. Finally, Hart looks at whether
the totality of the act “shocks the conscience.”193 This final factor invokes
the numerous transgressions of constitutional protections that result from
the Baby AIDS Bill—the invasion of privacy, the force of treatment, and
185. Hart, 432 F.3d at 805; see also HIV Among Pregnant Women, Children, and Infants,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/group/gender/pregnant
women/index.html [https://perma.cc/W6ZE-7369] (last updated Mar. 21, 2018).
186. Hart, 432 F.3d at 805.
187. Olsen et al., supra note 16.
188. Hart, 432 F.3d at 805.
189. HIV Treatment: The Basics, supra note 141.
190. Hart, 432 F.3d at 805.
191. See, e.g., Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1062 (9th Cir. 2006).
192. Chemerinsky, supra note 85, at 1503. There is a critical distinction, particularly in health
care cases, between what is an ethical mandate within the medical profession and what the
government can subsume within constitutional limits. Chemerinsky characterizes medical aid-indying, for example, as “controversial, but as a constitutional matter, not difficult.” Id. This same
characterization is fitting for the Baby AIDS Bill, which likely would not have withstood the
constitutional analysis it should have been subjected to at its origination.
193. Hart, 432 F.3d at 805.
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the blurring of important functional lines between the legislature, the
court, and the medical profession. The disruption of defined fundamental
rights may not evoke the same sort of horror that the violence against
Joshua DeShaney did, but the fact that law like this can exist without
some sort of continuing care provision for the individuals affected is
necessary mitigation for the violation of liberty.
There are more stringent tests for the state-created danger, but most
conceptually seek to determine whether the government has (usually
recklessly) placed an individual in a worse situation than the individual
was in prior to the government action.194 Colloquially, the courts have
adopted the snake-pit metaphor from a famously colorful description by
Judge Richard Posner out of the Seventh Circuit to describe the idea of
placing someone in danger.195 Commonly, courts are trying to arrive at
whether the state put the individual at risk of “private violence” without
affording some protection.196
It is an uphill battle to define the contours of the harm that can result
from the Baby AIDS Bill. Doing so requires looking past the facial
benefit of the Bill, which seeks to prevent HIV infection and circumvent
any early fatal complications. It also requires that legislatures and health
departments stop conflating the “need to protect and treat” from an ethical
compulsion to do so.197 But this risk is a tradeoff, because the harm of
resistance to treatment merely comes later if the child is not guaranteed
consistent access to HIV care. Simply put, mandating treatment for HIV
without providing access to care creates harm without offering
protection—avoiding one snake pit in favor of another. For this narrow
population of babies born with HIV, in order to prevent a mere deferral
of harm, it would be necessary for there to be government-provided
health care that is neither subject to gaps in coverage, nor susceptible to
disappearance in the face of financial fluctuations, and is easily
administered despite race and class disparities.
194. Chemerinksy, supra note 106, at 15–18. Every circuit has some version of the test, and
the tests are primarily distinguished by some special requirement, such as shocking the conscience
or being part of a precise class. Id. New York, as a state in the Second Circuit, would actually be
held to a more relaxed standard, where an individual can proceed on a § 1983 action where it is
either in a special relationship with the government, or where the state created the danger. Id. at
18. Consider that in the case of the Baby AIDS Bill, either is possible, since children born into
the foster care system may have the status of a ward. See Pena v. Deprisco, 432 F.3d 98, 109 (2nd
Cir. 2005).
195. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (“If the state puts a man in a
position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect him, it will not be heard to say
that its role was merely passive; it is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a
snake pit.”).
196. Pena, 432 F.3d at 108–09.
197. Bryce, supra note 116.
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CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF THE BABY AIDS BILL FOR NATIONAL
HEALTH POLICY
Despite having existed for over two decades, mandatory testing for
HIV, especially without consent, has not caught fire in state public health
policies. When President Bill Clinton reauthorized the Ryan White
CARE Act, the Act included requirements that states demonstrate that
ninety-five percent of pregnant women were tested for HIV or that there
was otherwise a fifty percent reduction in infants born with HIV.198
Policy analysts speculate that the millions of dollars in funding tied to
this requirement were integral in encouraging new public health practices
to monitor or prevent perinatal transmission of HIV, particularly in New
York.199 Why, then, does only one other bill in the United States bear any
resemblance to New York’s in its mandate for unblind mandatory
testing?200 The answer likely lies in the relatively low benefit and the
considerably high risk of creating unsustainable and unconstitutional
public health policies.
As a public health practice, these bills do little empirically to move
the needle in reducing the transmission of HIV because the population is
so small and the first few years of life so difficult.201 Voluntary testing
and treatment have long been regarded as the preferred means of
monitoring HIV status in any situation, let alone widespread maternalfocused public health policies.202 In the aggregate, the absence of a
widespread adoption of mandatory unblind testing does not appear to
have been dispositive in abating the prevalence of vertical HIV
transmission: from 2008 to 2013, the rate of perinatal HIV transmission
dropped from 3.6 to 1.8 per 100,000 live births.203 Education and
voluntary testing are prevailing.
Without a guaranteed health care provision, the Baby AIDS Bill
epitomizes incomplete and dangerous legislation that reaches an
attainable goal by the most restrictive means.204 New York preserves a
198. Nicholson, supra note 116, at 175–76.
199. Abramson, supra note 126, at 332–33.
200. Bryce, supra note 116. Connecticut is the only other state that mandates testing of
newborns without the mother’s consent. Id.
201. Nicholson, supra note 116, at 182.
202. See Peter H. Berge, Setting Limits on Involuntary HIV Antibody Testing under Rule 35
and State Independent Medical Examination Statutes, 44 FLA. L. REV. 767, 798–99 (1992). Just a
decade into the epidemic, states were already keeping HIV testing separate from other involuntary
testing requirements mandated by medical examination statutes related to tort suits. Id. This was
reflective of an overwhelming consensus in the medical community that voluntary testing was
more workable and effective. Id. at 793.
203. Johnson et al., supra note 172, at 47 tbl.8(b).
204. Noah Marks, Least Restrictive Means: Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 9 HARV. L & POL’Y
REV. ONLINE 19, 21 (2015). When the Supreme Court applies a “strict scrutiny” standard in
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major vulnerability in its public health laws and regulations by allowing
this Bill to exist in its present form. The Baby AIDS Bill sets precedent
for involuntary testing and treatment, which gives the public health
community power over some of the most protected and sacred decisions
possible in our society.205 The legislature and judiciary should avoid the
furtherance and enforcement of policies like the Baby AIDS Bill without
the necessary constitutional support in place first. A public health practice
that so wantonly affects individuals’ future health without any provision
for the necessity of care it creates is fraught with danger. The conflicts
between this policy and clearly defined constitutional rights regarding
active treatment, bodily autonomy, and fundamental privacy compound
this danger. Until the government provides comprehensive health care for
HIV, the harm the Baby AIDS Bill has created remains unmitigated.

assessing violation of fundamental rights, it generally looks at whether the challenged government
regulation is the least restrictive means of achieving the aim of the regulation, which seeks to
minimize government intrusion. Id. The Baby AIDS Bill, as demonstrated by the success of other
states with less restrictive requirements, does not meet this standard.
205. Nicholson, supra note 116, at 184–85.
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